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The Prevention and Treatment of
Breeding Contract Controversies
By JOHN J. KROPP*,
J. JEFFREY LANDEN** AND
MONICA A. DONATH***
INTRODUCTION
The increasing interest in the equine industry, both nationally
and internationally, has dramatically increased the stakes of the
game' and decreased reliance upon many of the time-honored
customs 2 and traditions of the business. The foundation of the
industry is breeding. Horsemen spend hour upon hour reviewing
pedigrees, performance records, progeny reports, breeding mixes
and crosses, as well as the relative conformational merits of the
individual animals. Once the horseman has exerted such an effort
to determine a promising match, that effort should be preserved
in a detailed, written breeding contract, but all too often it is
* Partner in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A. 1969,
University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1972, Georgetown University.
** Associate in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A.
1978, Centre College; J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
*** Associate in the firm of Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A.
1982, Duke University; J.D. 1985, University of Cincinnati.
I The thoroughbred portion of the industry, for example, has experienced dra-
matic price increases in the past decade with the average yearling auction prices in North
America increasing from a mere $10,943.00 in 1975 to approximately $41,396.00 in 1984.
See Auctions of 1984, 111 THE BLOOD HoRSE at 19 (Jan. 12, 1985). Moreover, the pool
of potential investors has expanded greatly within that period, with the entry of thou-
sands of newcomers into prominent roles in the thoroughbred industry. See id. The
funds made available by these new investors are no doubt related to the general pattern
of price increases.
I For a discussion of the role of custom and usage in the thoroughbred industry,
see Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom in the Equine Industry, 74 Ky. L.J.
781 (1985-86).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74
not. This Article discusses how the parties and their attorneys3
can anticipate and allay the sources of breeding controversies,
and how they can deal with disputes that arise.
I. THE ACQUISITION OF BREEDING RIGHTS
The parties may make various arrangements for breeding a
stallion4 to a mare,' but usually a mare owner will purchase a
right to breed his mare to a stallion on a one-time, nonrecurring
basis. This one-time breeding right is called a "season," ' 6 and
the agreement to purchase a season is commonly embodied in a
breeding contract. Other ways in which the breeding can be
handled from a business standpoint include (i) the mare owner's
purchase of a partial ownership interest in a syndicated stallion;7
(ii) the stallion owner's lease of a mare from a mare owner for
a specified term so that he can breed the mare to his stallion; 8
The greatest difficulty for the attorney may be convincing the client that a
formal, written contract is necessary, and that the involvement of an attorney in
preparing and/or tailoring such a contract to a specific situation is appropriate.
4 The term stallion refers to a "male horse used for the purpose of breeding."
J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, SUCCESSFUL THOROUGHBRED INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING
MARKET 220 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as "Lom4AN & KIRicPATIucK"].
' The term mare refers to a "[flemale thoroughbred five years old or older, or
younger if she has been bred." Id. at 216.
6 Id. at 220.
Typically, the ownership of a stallion may be divided into approximately 40
units, called "shares." The owner of each share is entitled to breed one or more of his
mares to the stallion each year, and the terms under which the breeding is conducted
are governed by the stallion's syndication agreement. See, e.g., id. at 160. Because the
syndication agreement is usually very specific, so long as the owner of the share breeds
only his own mares to the stallion, there is little need for a separate breeding contract.
The nature of the breeding rights provided in such a syndicate agreement is beyond the
scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion of stallion syndicates in general, see
Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82); and Campbell,
Racing Syndicates as Securities, 74 Ky. L.J. 691 (1985-86). If the owner of a stallion share
decides not to breed to his own mares, however, and instead transfers his right to breed
to the stallion in a particular year to a third party, a separate breeding contract is once
again required. For a discussion of the need to coordinate the terms of such a breeding
contract with the terms of the underlying syndication agreement, see text accompanying
notes 11-12 infra.
When a stallion owner leases a mare, the lease agreement typically provides that
any offspring born as a result of the breeding to the lessee's stallion will be the property
of the lessee. See, e.g., LoH?4AN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, at 165-66. Although
many of the considerations discussed in this Article are also significant in the leasing
context, lease agreements are not generally considered breeding contracts; therefore, lease
agreements are outside the scope of this Article.
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(iii) foal sharing arrangements, 9 and (iv) the simplest of all,
breeding one's own mares to one's own stallions. 0 This Article
focuses on the basic transaction in which the mare owner pur-
chases a stallion season.
Before making any decisions about the terms of the breeding
contract between a stallion owner and a mare owner, the parties
must determine the ownership status of the stallion. If the stal-
lion is owned by a joint venture, partnership or syndicate, the
seller of the breeding rights may be restricted by an oral or
written agreement. Any agreement reached by the mare owner
and the seller of a season that would interfere with the perform-
ance of the seller's contract with a stallion syndicate, partnership
or joint venture could be unenforceable on grounds of public
policy." The seller may also find himself subjected to inconsist-
ent contractual obligations. Thus, it is important that the parties
to the transaction recognize and understand any limitations on
the seller before drafting the breeding contract. 2
Foal sharing usually refers to an arrangement in which a stallion owner and a
mare owner agree to breed their respective horses, sharing ownership rights in the
offspring "by either owning a one-half interest in each foal or owning every other foal
the broodmare produces." Id. at 214. Once again, there are similar considerations in
the purchase of seasons and in foal sharing arrangements, but the latter is outside the
scope of this Article.
10 Although a stallion is normally bred to approximately 45 mares per year, a
stallion can be bred to as many as 70 to 80 mares per year. A mare, however, can be
bred to only one stallion per year. Thus, it would be most unusual to find a stallion
owner restricting the breeding of the stallion exlusively to his own mares.
1 See, e.g., Lehigh v. Pittson Co., 456 A.2d 355, 361 (Me. 1983) (a contract which
operates to breach a prior contract involving a third party is illegal); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 194 (1979) ("A promise that tortiously interferes with per-
formance of a contract with a third person or a tortiously induced promise to commit
a breach of contract is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979) (one who intentionally interferes with the
performance of a contract between another and a third party may be subject to liability
to the other for pecuniary loss suffered by the other).
12 For example, if the stallion is syndicated, both the syndicate member selling his
season and the mare owner should carefully review the syndication agreement to ensure
that the proposed breeding contract is consistent with the syndication documents. Many
breeding contracts incorporate the syndication agreement by reference into the breeding
contract. In doing so, one should consult local law to be sure that no "magic words"
are necessary to effect the incorporation. See generally Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp.
v. Joseph, 641 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (where contract language incorporated
by reference other "terms and conditions," such provisions were binding). Unless the
document being incorporated contains a confidentiality clause prohibiting its public
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One other issue deserves attention before turning to the
specific issues involved in drafting a breeding contract and liti-
gating the effect of such a contract: What body of substantive
law governs breeding contracts-the general contract law of the
applicable jurisdiction or the Uniform Commerical Code
(U.C.C.)? 3 If a breeding contract involves a sale of goods,
article 2 of the U.C.C. governs all disputes 4 and the parties can
invoke so-called "gap-filler" provisions of the U.C.C. to supply
certain terms that may have been omitted. 5 On the other hand,
if the transaction is not a sale of "goods' '1 6 within the meaning
of the U.C.C., the breeding arrangements are subject only to
the general contract law of the applicable jurisdiction. 7
Although the sale of a horse is clearly governed by the
U.C.C.,18 the sale of breeding rights is not so clearly covered.
In Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse,'9 one appellate court recently held
that "[s]perm inside a stallion... is not readily separable nor
able to be packaged,' '20 and that breeding rights therefore are
not goods. 2' The court hedged its decision by noting that arti-
ficial insemination was not used in the breeding at issue and
suggested that its conclusions would not apply if the sperm has
been separated from the stallion and shipped to the mare in an
appropriate container. 22
disclosure, the safest course is to attach to the breeding contract a copy of any such
pre-existing syndicate, partnership or joint venture agreement.
'" When reference is made to the Uniform Commerical Code (U.C.C.), the refer-
ence is to the 1972 version unless otherwise noted.
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1972).
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (1972) (course of dealing, usage of trade); U.C.C. §
2-305 (1972) (price); U.C.C. § 2-306 (1972) (quantity); U.C.C. § 2-308 (1972) (delivery);
U.C.C. § 2-309 (1972) (time for performance).
16 See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1972) ("goods" are all things that are moveable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale).
17 Because contract law varies from state to state, reference is made throughout
this Article to the general principles of contract law as embodied in the widely followed
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. In considering any specific breeding contract or
breeding rights dispute, the law of the particular jurisdiction involved should be con-
sulted.
. See Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968); Keck v.
Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
19 702 P.2d 1226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
20 Id. at 1228.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 1228 n.l. See also Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v.
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Artificial insemination is not used in the thoroughbred seg-
ment of the horse industry, but it is commonly used in the
Arabian, quarter horse, and standardbred segments. Moreover,
where breeders employ artificial insemination, it is sometimes
used in conjunction with a natural "cover. '" Thus, if the courts
follow the Kwik-Lok decision, breeding rights could be goods
for one portion of the horse industry but not for another, or
even for one portion of a given breeding transaction but not for
the other portion of the same transaction. The stallion's semen,
once removed from the horse, is in fact a movable physical
commodity, and the entire breeding transaction has some char-
acteristics of a "mixed bag" goods and services contract. The
problems inherent in these differing characterizations may cause
other courts to reject Kwik-Lok and attempt to bring all breeding
rights, rather than just artificial insemination breeding rights,
within the meaning of goods. 24 The Kentucky Court of Appeals,
however, in North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble,25 had no trou-
ble concluding that a stallion season is not goods. In North
Ridge, the court held that part ownership of a syndicated stallion
with the right to breed a mare on a yearly basis is a good, 26 but
that a mere right to breed is not a good because it conveys no
actual ownership 27 and is not "moveable."
Thus it appears, under current precedents, that breeding
rights will be considered goods, and fall within U.C.C. coverage,
when attached to an ownership interest in the horse or when
artificial insemination is the chosen means of breeding. The right
to breed to a stallion for a single season, by natural cover,
Y Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979) (holding the U.C.C. applicable to contract to
sell bull semen for artificial insemination).
n "Cover" refers to the "breeding of a mare to a stallion." LOHMAN & KIRKPA-
TRICK, supra note 4, at 212.
24 Despite the dicta in Kwik-Lok, there may still be considerable doubt about
whether breeding rights should come within the scope of the U.C.C. For purposes of
this Article, the question of whether breeding rights are goods is considered open.
Citations to both the REsTAT MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS and to the U.C.C. are
therefore supplied where appropriate.




11 Id. at 1291.
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severed from any incident of ownership, however, is not a good.
II. THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A BREEDING CONTRACT
A. Price, Payment and Warranties
The breeding contract must recite what the consideration for
the breeding will be, as well as how and when it will be paid.29
Most breeding contracts provide that the price for the season,
the so-called "stud fee,''30 is due and payable when the mare
produces a live foal.3 ' In certain segments of the horse industry,
a nonrefundable booking32 fee may be charged. There are, how-
ever, many situations that require a total or partial up-front
payment of the stud fee. If the stallion is in extremely high
demand, its owner is dealing from a strong position and may be
able to get the entire fee paid in advance. This situation is rare,
but requiring at least part of the fee up front has in recent years
become a common practice in the horse industry.
Normally, the up-front fee is not refundable,3 3 but the bal-
ance of the stud fee is due only if and when the mare produces
" In the absence of specific provisions relating to how and when payment is to
be made in a sale of goods, a reasonable manner of payment is implied and payment is
due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-
305 (1972); id. § 2-310 (1972). Unfortunately, equine industry practice results in expec-
tations of payment that are quite specific but quite unlike the payment expectations of
most nonagricultural industries. See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra. Therefore, in
the absence of a strong argument (supported by expert witnesses) demonstrating the
actual trade usage in the equine industry, the payment term implied by a court is not
likely to comport with either party's expectations.
" The term stud fee refers to "a fee for the right to breed a mare to a stallion
during the breeding period." LoisN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, at 221. The stud fee
provision in the breeding contract can specifically provide that the mare owner agrees
to pay any sales or use tax. See, e.g., KRS § 139.531(l)(a) (taxes apply to fees paid for
breeding a stallion to a mare "in this state").
, See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra for a discussion of live foal guarantees.
n In the horse industry, the term book refers to "the group of mares being bred
to a stallion in one given year." LomAN & KIRKPATPICK, supra note 4, at 210.
" The mare owner may argue that such an up-front fee allocable to the booking
itself is given without consideration to the extent that a breeding never actually takes
place, and that such a fee is "refundable" in any event unless a breeding does take
place. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 71 (1979). Nevertheless, the stallion
owner can insist that, because the stallion's breeding services are a commodity in high
demand, the reservation itself has value distinct from the stallion's breeding services.
Because a court generally will look only to whether there is consideration, rather than
to its sufficiency, id. § 79 (1979), the stallion owner probably has the stronger side of
the argument.
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a live foal.3 4 Many other breeding contracts provide that if the
mare is in foal, then the stud fee is due and payable on Septem-
ber 1 of the year of the cover, but that if the mare subsequently
slips35 or dies, then either the stud fee is refunded 6 or the mare
owner gets a return season in the following year.37 Obviously,
from the mare owner's viewpoint, breeding on a live foal basis
with the fee due only when the foal stands and nurses is pref-
erable.38
Although most stallion breeding contracts provide a so-called
"live foal guarantee," some consideration should be given to
exactly what this guarantee means. Most breeding contracts do
not go far enough to ensure that there will not be a controversy
if the mare produces a live foal that dies soon after birth. At
what point is the guarantee satisfied?39 A reasonable compromise
might provide that the mare must produce a live foal that can
stand alone and nurse, and that if the foal falls to do either and
subsequently dies, the live foal guarantee is not satisfied. The
1' Structuring the deal in this manner makes production of a live foal a condition
precedent to the mare owner's duty to perform by making the remainder of the payment
contingent upon the production of a live foal. See id. § 224 (1979) ("a condition is an
event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused,
before performance under a contract becomes due").
" The word slipped, in the context of equine breeding, means "a pregnancy
aborted or resorbed spontaneously." LoImAN & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, at 219. A
mare is said to slip when it has "been bred, conceived, and then aborted." Id.
, In the case of a September I payment date, the production of a live foal
becomes a condition subsequent. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CON'RAcTs § 76 (1979)
(The nonoccurrence of a condition discharges the duty when the condition can no longer
occur.).
" A "return season" is the opportunity to rebreed the mare to the stallion. See
text accompanying notes 42-49 infra for a detailed discussion of rights of refund or
return.
38 The tax consequences of receiving a refundable stud fee are discussed in Whit-
aker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 259 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1958). The Fifth
Circuit held in Whitaker that the receipt of a stud fee is considered income to the
stallion owner in the year paid, even if the buyer may be entitled to a refund in a later
year. Id. at 382-84. The effect of the refund, if any, is a deduction for the amount of
the stud fee refunded in the year it is actually refunded. Id. at 382. The court's rationale
was that the stallion owner has a "claim of right" to the breeding fee in the year it is
paid, even if he is required to refund it later. Id. at 382-84. Thus, a stallion owner who
wants the stud fee up front, or on September I in the year of the breeding, must be
willing to recognize the income in that year, regardless of the refund or return privileges
that he may grant.
1 Requiring that the foal live for not less than 24 hours is not uncommon.
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contract may also include a provision that if a foal is hand-fed
for a specified period of time,4° the stud fee is payable.
The parties must give special consideration to the possibility
that the mare may bear twins.41 One possible resolution of this
problem is to consider the live foal guarantee satisfied if either
of the twins stands and nurses. The "second" foal is ignored
for purposes of the guarantee and the fee provided in the con-
tract is neither increased nor decreased because of its birth. The
breeding contract should contain provisions clarifying the amount
payable to the stallion owner under these circumstances, because
in the absence of such of a clause, the stallion owner's suit to
collect the stud fee may become mired in a battle of expert
testimony about the merits and disadvantages of twins and a
dispute over the use in the breeding contract of the word "foal"
in the singular.
Breeding contracts including a live foal guarantee should
specifically provide for some method of enforcing the guarantee.
Typically, such a provision would require a waiver of the unpaid
service fee, refund of a paid service fee, or a right to breed the
mare or her substitute in the following season. In using any of
these provisions, the stallion owner should insist on a contract
provision requiring the immediate submission of a veterinarian's
certificate verifying that no foal was produced. Such a provision
will ease the stallion owner's burdens of production 2 and
persuasion 43 in a suit to collect the stud fee. The primary focus
of the action will shift from whether a live foal was produced-
a fact possibly within the exclusive knowledge of the mare
owner-to whether the buyer has complied with the certificate
requirement.
40 If the foal cannot stand, as a practical matter, it cannot nurse from its mother.
In such circumstances, the foal is commonly hand-fed its mother's milk. Where hand-
feeding is contemplated by the breeding contract, a period of 72 hours before the foal
can nurse on its own has been provided.
41 In the equine breeding industry, twins are not usually considered a double
blessing. 2 EQUINE MEDICINE AND SURGERY 1349 (R. Mansmann & E. McAllister 3d ed.
1982) [hereinafter referred to as "EQtmnE MEDICINE"]. Because of the disadvantages of
equine twins, the mare owner may contend that the birth of inferior twins does not
satisfy the live foal guarantee. Therefore, mare owners may want to bargain for a clause
that requires the birth of "a single live foal."




Such a notification provision may be inadvertantly waived
by the stallion owner. In Braugh v. Phillips," the buyer sued
for return of the stallion service fee paid under a breeding
contract that provided for a refund if a live foal did not result
from the mating.45 The refund was conditioned on written no-
tificaton by the buyer to the seller within forty-eight hours of
an abortion or failure to produce a live foal, followed by a
veterinarian's certificate within fourteen days confirming that a
live foal was not produced. 46 The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's judgment for the buyer, despite the seller's insistence
that the buyer had failed to comply with the notification pro-
cedures. 47 The court found that the seller had waived the formal
notification procedure because he knew that the mare was not
in foal as a result of his conversations with the buyer. The court
also implied that the seller's acknowledgement that the mare was
not in foal was an admission that he did indeed have notice of
the mare's condition. 48
The Braugh case was incorrectly decided, at least to the
extent that the court construed the seller's informal conversations
with the buyer as a waiver of the requirement of a veterinarian's
certificate. Those conversations might have constituted substan-
tial performance of the forty-eight hour personal notification
from the buyer, but they in no way provided the seller with the
independent, professional verification and resulting ease in proof
that the provision was intended to provide. In any event, Braugh
suggests that counsel to stallion owners should advise their clients
to insist on strict compliance with all breeding contract notice
provisions, even if they obtain actual knowledge of a given
situation informally. Furthermore, the attorney should warn
against casual admissions that may be introduced as proof of
such knowledge.
557 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
' Id. at 156.
" Id.
" Id. at 157.
" Id. When the buyer's veterinarian found that the mares were not pregnant, the
buyer phoned the seller. Id. at 159. The seller requested production of the veterinarian
certificates verifying that the mares were not in foal, but before receiving the certificates
the seller acknowledged in a letter to the buyer that the mares were not pregnant. Id.
at 159-60.
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If the contract provides for a return breeding, certain addi-
tional questions may arise. If there was a booldng fee, should a
second fee be charged? If there were handling fees, will these
fees be required for the next breeding season? Many breeding
contracts provide that if the mare remains at the farm where the
stallion stands49 for a specified period of time following the
breeding, in good health, properly vaccinated and available for
rebreeding through the end of the breeding season, handling fees
will not be assessed for the following year.
Not all breeding contracts include the express warranty that
the live foal guarantee provides." If the parties do not intend
to include a live foal guarantee or other express warranty, the
agreement must be carefully drafted to ensure that no unintended
express or implied warranties come into play to benefit the mare
owner and to surprise the stallion owner. If the U.C.C. applies
to the sale of breeding rights, 5 implied warranties of
merchantability 2 and fitness for a particular purpose 53 can arise
unless properly excluded.54 Even if U.C.C. implied warranties
49 A stallion is said to "stand" where it resides and performs its breeding services.
10 See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra for a discussion of live foal guarantees.
1' See text accompanying notes 13-28 supra for a discussion of the applicability of
the U.C.C. to the sale of breeding rights.
52 U.C.C.§ 2-314 (1972) provides in pertinent part:
(1) [A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description
... ;and...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used
53 U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972) provides in pertinent part:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.
There is, unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
14 Under the U.C.C., the seller must use specific language to negate the creation
of implied warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1972) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchant-
ability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
1985-86] BREEDING CONTRACT CONTROVERSIES
do not apply to a breeding contract, the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts may imply a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. 51
Courts have been willing to find an unintended express war-
ranty in the sale of a stallion. In Appleby v. Hendrix,5 6 a stallion
owner placed an advertisement for a breeding stallion in The
Arabian Horse World addressed "Dear Breeder. 57 The plain-
tiff, relying on the advertisement, bought the horse for breeding
purposes .5  The buyer sued under theories of misrepresentation59
and breach of express warranty, 6° alleging that the horse was
infertile. 6' The court found that the advertisement created an
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which -
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
Failure to meet the standard of U.C.C. § 2-316 can result in the creation of implied
warranties, even where the seller clearly attempted to negate them. See, e.g., Valley Iron
& Steel Co. v. Thorin, 562 P.2d 1212 (Or. 1977) (attempt to negate warranty for
particular purpose failed); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133 (S.D.
1977) (attempt to negate warranty of merchantibility unsuccessful).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COTRACTS § 220 (1979) (The meaning or inter-
pretation given to a term in a contract may vary depending on the usage of that term.
If a usage has a particular meaning in that business context and both parties are aware
of that meaning, it becomes a part of the contract.).
- 673 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
Id. at 296.
~'Id.
The buyer contended that the seller had misrepresented the stallion as being fit
for breeding and that she had relied on that misrepresentation. Id. at 297.
60 Id.
61 The buyer contended that the seller breached his express warranty that the
stallion was fit for breeding purposes. Id.
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express warranty of suitability for breeding 2 and that the seller
had breached the warranty. 63
In McKnight v. Bellamy,64 the seller represented a mare he
sold at an auction as having been "bred. '65 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court found that custom" in the horse auction business
dictated that, when a mare is represented as having been bred,
the buyer's reasonable assumption is that she is in foal and that,
if she is not, the buyer is entitled to return privileges for rebreed-
ing to the same stallion or to his choice of another of the seller's
stallions.67 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
judgment for return of the purchase price to the buyer.6 Cases
such as Appleby and McKnight69 suggest a judicial willingness
to transform the parties' "loose" language about the horses
being bred into unintended express warranties. For this reason,
breeding contracts should expressly negate the existence of any
rights of refund or return if none are intended. The stallion
owner also runs the risk that, even if the parties do not express
or suggest a guarantee verbally, as a matter of law one may be
implied. Express negation of all warranties in the breeding con-
tract is thus of great importance to the stallion owner. 70
In contrast to the mare owner's concerns about fertility, the
stallion owner should be concerned about the health and con-
dition of the mare. The stallion owner should require that the
mare be healthy and in sound breeding condition, and that the
mare's condition be certified by a qualified veterinarian. In light
62 Id.
63 Id. at 298-99.
4 449 S.W.2d 706 (Ark. 1970).
65 Id. at 706.
The RESTATE EINT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1979) provides that course of
performance between the parties, course of dealing and usage of trade may be used to
interpret the intent of the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1979)
states that express terms will have priority over course of performance, which prevails
over course of dealing, which in turn prevails over usage of trade. U.C.C. § 1-205 (1972)
provides that course of dealing and usage of trade may be considered to supplement or
qualify terms of an agreement. See also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1972) (course of dealing, usage
of trade, course of performance); U.C.C. § 2-208 (1972) (course of performance).
67 449 S.W.2d at 706-07.
Is Id. at 706.
69 See also White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(allowing buyer to rescind where stallion was unfit for breeding).
7' See note 54 supra for a discussion of the exclusion of warranties.
[Vol. 74
BREEDING CONTRACT CONTROVERSIES
of the recent outbreak of certain contagious equine diseases, 7'
the stallion owner should protect himself by providing a right
to refuse service to any mare exposed to such diseases.72 The
breeding contract should also allow the stallion owner to refuse
to breed the mare until she is ready.
The mare's condition is particularly important if the mare is
to be boarded at the farm where the stallion stands. 73 The stallion
owner may require that the mare have all necessary vaccinations
and a negative Coggin's test. If clean cultures are necessary, this
requirement should be set out in the agreement. Finally, if the
mare needs veterinary care, the contract should authorize this
treatment and provide that it will be performed at the mare
owner's expense.
In addition, the contract should provide for the effect of the
death of either the stallion or the mare. Typically, breeding
contracts stipulate that if either animal dies, the contract is null
and void and each party is thereby released from responsibility. 74
This protection is necessary to limit the stallion owner's liability
to all season holders if his horse becomes ill or injured during
the breeding season.
B. Sale of the Stallion or the Mare
The parties to a breeding contract should provide for the
procedures to be followed if either the stallion or mare is sold
during the term of the breeding agreement. The relative strengths
and weaknesses of the negotiating parties will determine who
" Herbert, On Arteritis - Regulations and Recommendations, I l1 Tim BLOOD-
HORSE 984-87 (Feb. 9, 1985).
72 The clause should specifically provide that if the stallion owner refuses a mare
because of her condition, he is not liable to the mare owner for damages. See note 113
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of incidental and consequential damages.
7 Generally, the mare will be boarded at the farm where the stallion stands for
two primary reasons: first, to enable the stallion manager to coordinate the mare's
breeding cycle with breedings for other holders of breeding rights; and second, to ensure
the best possible conditions for a breeding to avoid the necessity for rebreeding of the
mare during the breeding season.
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979). If "a party's perform-
ance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty
to render that performance is discharged .... Id.
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will benefit most from these provisions. The mare owner may
wish to provide that if the stallion is sold, it must be sold subject
to the terms and conditions of the breeding contract and with a
requirement that the new owner will honor the contract. 7- If
such a provision is included in the contract, the careful mare
owner might also require that if the stallion is removed from a
certain location as a result of the sale, the mare owner has either
the right to a refund or the right to breed to another stallion
owned by the same breeder. This provision eliminates the risk
of having to ship the mare a distance that was not orginally
contemplated by the agreement. On the other hand, because
the stallion owner may want to sell the stallion 76 either prior
to or during the course of the breeding season, he might resist
any suggestion that the contract should carry over to the new
owners. The mare owner's remedy may thus be limited to con-
tract damages."
In Taylor v. Johnston,78 the sale of the stallion Fleet Nas-
rullah gave rise to a breach of contract action by a buyer of
breeding services that the stallion was to perform in California
71 The mare owner may have a difficult time enforcing his breeding rights against
a subsequent buyer who qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value. See U.C.C. § 2-
403 (1972). See also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-307(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp.
1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS] (bona fide purchaser at auction takes clear of all security
interests).
76 The sale of the stallion does not void the contract, and the stallion owner cannot
claim that he is discharged because his performance was made impracticable through his
own fault. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) (discharge permissible
only where performance is made impracticable without fault). See, e.g., Baumer v.
Franklin County Distilling Co., 135 F.2d 384, 388 (6th Cir.) (liquor distributing contract
breached upon manufacturer's sale of rights to a particular brand rendering delivery to
the plaintiff "impossible"), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 750 (1943).
" The courts will award specific performance for a breach of contract for personal
services only when equity requires it and proper relief cannot be obtained otherwise.
See, e.g., Wehen v. Lundgaard, 107 P.2d 491, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940). The argument
against the applicability of such precedents is that the court's unvAllingness to order
specific performance for human services arises from an unwillingness to compel an
individual to perform services against his will. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. In the
breeding contract context, the services provided are really those of the horse, and only
incidentally those of its owner in conducting the breeding, so specific performance may
be available. See, e.g., Johnson v. Stumbo, 126 S.W.2d 165, 174 (Ky. 1938) (vendors of
a hospital could sue buyers for specific performance of agreement to permit physician
to bring patients to the hospital).
" 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
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during 1966. The buyer's contract provided that he could breed
two mares to the stallion. In October, 1965, the defendant sold
the stallion to buyers in Kentucky who then syndicated him. 79
On the same day, the seller wrote to the plaintiff informing him
that the seller was released from his reservation of breeding
rights because the stallion was to stand in Kentucky. 80 Despite
the seller's letter and the sale of the horse, the mare owner
insisted on exercising his breeding rights and shipped his mares
to Kentucky.8' The buyer was told that arrangements had been
made with the syndicators to have his mares bred to the stal-
lion. 82 He tried numerous times during the period from April
17, 1966, to June 14, 1966, to have his mares booked to Fleet
Nasrullah, but had no success. On June 4 and June 14, before
the end of the breeding season, he bred his mares to another
stallion. 83 Subsequently, the buyer claimed that the sellers had
breached the breeding contract because they had made it impos-
sible for him to arrange his bookings. 4
The trial court held that, by selling the stallion, the defend-
ants "put it out of their power to perform properly their con-
tracts with plaintiff," and gave judgment to the plaintiff on the
theory of anticipatory repudiation.85 On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court of California held that the time for performance
had not yet arrived when the plaintiff bred his mares to the
other stallion and that no anticipatory breach therefore could be
charged against the seller. 86 Furthermore, the supreme court
found that an anticipatory breach had indeed occurred when the
seller released the buyer from his reservation, but that the buyer
had nullified this repudiation by insisting on exerting his breed-
ing rights.8 7
The buyer argued that the breach occurred when the syndi-
cators refused to allow him to breed his mares to Fleet Nasrul-
7" Id. at 427.
Id. at 427-28.
, Id. at 428.
Id. at 428 n.3.
" Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 429 n.5.
Id. at 433.
" Id. at 431.
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lah.88 Nevertheless, the court found no evidence of a repudiation
once the mares had reached Kentucky, because, although the
buyer's breeding right had clearly been subordinated89 to the
rights of the syndicate shareholders, the syndicators had never
told the buyer that they would not perform.90 Even though the
actions of the syndicators delayed performance of the contract,
the court found that the delay did not amount to a breach and
gave judgment to the sellers. 91 Because the timing of breeding is
so important, 92 there is a strong argument that the Taylor court
should have awarded the buyer damages for delay.
The buyer of the season in Taylor might have been able to
avoid this outcome if he had specified in his breeding contract
that the stallion could only be sold subject to the terms of his
breeding contract, and that his breeding rights would not be
subordinated to the booking rights of later syndicate sharehold-
ers. 93
Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse94 involved the sale of a stallion to
which the plaintiff had two free annual breeding rights for an
unlimited duration.95 After he sold the stallion to someone else,
the stallion owner notified the plaintiff that he could no longer
provide the plaintiff with his breeding rights. 96 Instead of deter-
mining whether the seller had actually breached the contract, as
did the court in Taylor,97 the Kwik-Lok court focused on the
grant of breeding rights itself.98 The stallion owner had granted
the breeding rights to the plaintiff in a letter that did not state
the duration of the contract. 99 The court held that the failure to
Id. at 429 n.5, 431, 432.
- Typically, a syndication agreement does not provide for priority in the exercise
of a breeding right by a syndicate shareholder over a nonshareholder with a breeding
right.
9o 539 P.2d at 431 n.ll.
91 Id. at 432-33.
91 See note 106 infra for a discussion of the importance of the timing of breeding.
91 The buyer's contract restrictions may not have been enforceable against a later
syndicate shareholder who qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value.
94 702 P.2d 1226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
91 Id. at 1227-28.
96 Id. at 1228.
w See 539 P.2d at 428, 432-33.




state the duration of the contract made it ambiguous,/° and
remanded the case to the lower court to determine its "reason-
able" duration.' 0' The court gave some guidance to the lower
court regarding the factors it should consider in determining the
reasonable duration of the contract.'02 Those factors included
consideration of the lifetime of the horse, the breeding life of
the horse, the life of the plaintiff and the time of sale of the
horse. 103 As in Taylor,14 the mare owner might have avoided
this controversy if he had specifically stated the terms of the
contract.
The potential sale of the mare is also cause to insert protec-
tive clauses in a live foal guarantee breeding agreement. The
stallion owner may require that, if an in-foal mare is sold after
the service, the stud fee shall be due and payable. Typically,
such a clause also provides that there will be no refund of the
stud fee thereafter. This language is important to the stallion
owner who has consciously contracted with a mare owner whom
he knows has a good track record with respect to the mainte-
nance and care of mares during their pregnancy, because the
sale of the mare may change the stallion owner's risk under the
live foal guarantee.
C. Designation of the Breeding Season and Breeding Priority
The time period during which the horses are to be bred
should be specifically set forth in the agreement to avoid prob-
lems such as those experienced by the buyer in Kwik-Lok. 05 The
thoroughbred industry conducts its breeding season annually
o Id. at 1229.
Io' d. at 1232.
1Id. at 1229.
101 Id. The court was misinformed in suggesting that the lower court could have
decided that a reasonable duration of the contract was for any period other than the
lifetime of the horse, the norm in the equine industry. See note 29 supra for a discussion
of custom and usage of trade in the horse industry. See note 106 infra for a discussion
of the importance of breeding dates.
"1 539 P.2d at 428, 432-33.
10, See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Kwik-Lok.
The gap filler provided by U.C.C. § 2-309 (1972), which would instruct a court to imply




from February to July; therefore, it is essential that the mare be
able to breed to the stallion during that period.05
A problem related both to the pertinent dates of the breeding
season and to the sale of the mare or stallion is the issue of the
breeding priority on a given day. If two mares are ready to be
bred to the stallion at the same time, which one of them should
go first? From the mare owner's standpoint, it would be helpful
to have a priority system spelled out in the breeding contract,
but this is not normally the case. The industry norm is that the
stallion manager makes the decision. Can the mare owner protect
himself in this situation? It is quite possible that his mare may
be skipped and thus he will miss a breeding opportunity, as in
Taylor.10 Even if the breeding contract provides access during a
designated breeding season, the mare owner may miss a heat
cycle because the stallion was booked when the mare was ready. 0 3
The parties can draft a breeding contract to set out a breed-
ing priority system. As indicated earlier, priority systems are not
common and breeding priorities are traditionally established on
a dally basis by the stud manager. At many farms, priorities are
determined on a first come, first serve basis.1t9 If breeding prior-
ity is a concern, the wise mare owner will inquire into the farm's
practice and specify priority in the breeding contract.
D. Boarding, Care and Liability
If necessary, the breeding contract should also contain clauses
regarding the boarding of the mare."0 In many situations, the
106 Thoroughbreds are considered one year old on the January 1 following their
actual birth date. Because the gestation period of the horse is approximately 335 to 342
days, see 2 EQUINE MEDICINE, supra note 41, at 1352, mares bred in January could foal
in late December of the same year and the foal could be considered one year old on
January 1 of the next year, although it would in fact be less than one month old. Those
mares bred in July could foal as late as June, thus forcing the mare owner to miss a
breeding year.
"I See 539 P.2d at 428.
10 Typically, a mare is receptive to breeding for five to seven days. See 2 EQUINE
MEDICINE, supra note 41, at 1350. If several mares are ready at the same time, the
syndicate manager must choose, because the stallion can provide only a limited service.
309 Often, when stallion owners and mare owners are in close vicinity, the parties
rely on known practice and reputation. Once the parties are separated by greater
distances, the need for a formal breeding contract is more compelling.




farm charges a per-day fee and the parties do not enter into a
specific boarding arrangement."' This practice has developed in
many areas of the country where there are established boarding
procedures and charges. If the mare is to go to an area of the
country or to a farm that is not familiar to the mare owner, the
mare owner should ensure that the mare will receive adequate
treatment."2 The mare owner should carefully review the farm's
practices regarding management of its horses and outline in
writing each party's expectations before entering into a boarding
agreement.
Boarding arrangements can be included in the breeding con-
tract or in separate agreements. The provisions should cover
daily or monthly charges, feeding arrangements, pasture access,
stabling, veterinary attention (both routine and emergency), far-
rier services and any other provisions that are unique to the
specific situation.
The breeding contract should also deal with the possibility
of accident, injury, disease, or death of the mare or stallion, as
well as each party's responsibility therefor. "1 Normally, each
M A written agreement avoids problems with the enforceability of an oral boarding
agreement. See KRS § 371.010 (1972).
"2 As the network of horsemen expands, the client may be tempted to rely on the
assurance of a "friend of a friend" that the proposed boarding farm gives adequate
treatment. The client should be warned that these assurances are not guarantees and
that a written contract is necessary.
- Unless expressly provided for, accident, injury, disease or death of the mare or
stallion could lead to a breach of contract action. The RTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF
Co'IA cTs § 347 (1981) states that, subject to limitations when the injured party could
have avoided damage (§ 350), the loss was unforseeable (§ 351), the evidence does not
establish the damage with reasonable certainty (§ 352), and loss is due to emotional
disturbance § 353): IT]he injured party has a right to damages based on his
expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in value to him of the other party's performance
caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidential or consequential loss,
caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to
perform.
U.C.C. §§ 2-711 through 2-716 delineate the buyer's remedies for breach of contract. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to 2-716 (1972). These entitle the buyer to a refund of the purchase
price, cover and, where appropriate, specific performance, see U.C.C. § 2-711, and to
incidental and consequential damages, see U.C.C. § 2-715. See, e.g., Peckham v. Larsen
Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc., 587 P.2d 816 (Idaho 1978) (U.C.C. § 2-711 allows
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party agrees to waive the other party's liability for such an
event, unless caused by one party's negligence. For example, as
recognized by the court in Sheets v. Robin,"4 normally the
stallion owner decides on the type of breeding between the
stallion and the mare. Thus, in Sheets, the stallion owner was
not held liable for his decision not to have the mare halter bred
to the stallion, even when the mare allegedly sustained injuries
as a result of an alternate method of breeding." 5
The stallion owner and the mare owner may also want to
require that if there is an insurable loss to either of the animals,
the respective insurance policies contain provisions waiving rights
of subrogation to the respective claims. The stallion owner may
want a specific exception to this provision that imposes liability
on the mare owner for any loss of the stallion caused by the
unhealthy condition of the mare.
Insurance covering the loss of the mare is, of course, avail-
able to her owner. The stallion owner normally will not carry
that type of insurance on any of the mares boarded on the farm
or in attendance for breeding. The breeding contract should
recite that the mare owner has the option to purchase such
insurance and that the stallion owner has no responsibility to
purchase insurance covering any losses relating to the mare.
The stallion owner should seek a clause indemnifying him
for any loss resulting from the breeding of the mare. This places
the responsibility for the mare's action with its owner. The mare
owner may also seek such indemnification from the stallion
owner and the farm for any loss he may incur as a result of
their actions.
E. Breeding Certificates
The mare owner should include a provision in the breeding
contract requiring the stallion owner to provide the mare owner
cancellation by the buyer if the "seller's delivery is such that it gives the buyer a right
to reject or a right to revoke acceptance of the goods").
Thus, for example, if a stallion owner breached his contract, the buyer would be
entitled to a return of the purchase price, plus incidental and consequential damages
under both the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs and the U.C.C.
380 So. 2d 137 (La. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 382 So. 2d 165 (La. 1980).
"I Id. at 138.
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with the necessary breeding certificates. The contract should
permit the stallion owner to withhold these certificates if the
mare owner has breached the breeding agreement or if his ac-
count with the farm is delinquent in any manner, thus providing
incentive for the mare owner to abide by the agreement and
keep his account current." 6
III. SPECIAL ISSUES IF TIM STALLION IS SYNDICATED
As previously mentioned, in the case of a syndicated stallion,
the breeding contract should reference and incorporate the syn-
dicate agreement and the system of breeding priority in the
contract, and should allow for accident and illness insurance
coverage. A number of other issues will arise, in the drafting
and litigation contexts, if the stallion is syndicated." 7
A. Liability and Insurance
Liability insurance is one such issue. Normally, syndicate
agreements provide that the syndicate manager will maintain a
public liability policy insuring the co-owners and the syndicate
manager against loss or liability caused by the syndicate manager
or his employees. The existence of such insurance should be
verified. Moreover, the parties should make sure that the mare
owner has liability insurance above and beyond the liability
insurance maintained by the syndicate for injury and damage
caused by the mare. Representations from the stallion owner,
the syndicate manager, and the mare owner as to the existence
of this coverage should be in the breeding contract itself. Ideally,
" See Underwood v. Williams, 488 S.W.2d 515, 518, 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(action for failure to sign breeding certificates that were a prerequisite to the registration
of the foal). As an additional means of enforcing payment, cautious stallion owners
may demand that the mare owner grant them a security interest in the foal produced
from the breeding and/or in the stallion service certificate. Questions about the consti-
tutionality of KRS § 376.420 have made complete reliance on Kentucky's statutory
stallion service lien less attractive. For a discussion of the stallion service lien, see Lester,
Secured Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred Horses: A Transactional Approach,
70 Ky. L.J. 1065, 1094-98 (1981-82).
"1 For an example of the difficulties that can befall the purchaser of a season to




each party can review the respective insurance policies to assure
themselves that the insurance is adequate and in full force and
effect.
B. Status of Syndicate Members' Account
Many syndicate agreements provide that if the co-owner is
not current in paying charges levied by the syndicate, the syn-
dicate manager can refuse to breed any mare nominated under
that co-owner's share. In addition, the agreement may permit
the syndicate manager to sell that co-owner's nomination and
apply the proceeds to the co-owner's outstanding obligations.
Therefore, the breeding contract should recite both that the co-
owner's account is current and that he or she has no outstanding
obligations to the syndicate at the time of the execution of the
contract. The breeding contract should provide that, in the event
the co-owner becomes obligated to the syndicate prior to the
mare owner's cover, the mare owner may pay those costs, de-
ducting them from the amount owed to the co-owner for the
stallion season."'
C. Notice and Transferability of the Season
Transferability of the season is another concern. Typically,
the syndicate agreement requires the holder of a season to notify
the syndicate manager in the event that he or she transfers that
right." 9 Nevertheless, a mare owner should specify in the breed-
ing contract that the seller of the season must promptly forward
the mare owner's name and address to the syndicate manager,
along with the identity of the mare and specifics of the breeding
arrangements. Simply requiring the seller to send a copy of the
breeding contract to the syndicate manager may be the easiest
method. In addition, however, the mare owner should contact
the syndicate manager directly, immediately after purchasing a
breeding right. This notice should track the information that the
syndicate manager receives from the seller of the season and
I's The provisions should permit, but not require, the mare owner to pay such
charges.
119 The parties may contract to limit the rights of transferability.
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should request that the syndicate manager inform the mare
owner of any special forms or procedures that must be com-
pleted.' 20
D. Reduced Book
The typical syndicate agreement makes provisions for either
an increased or a decreased number of breedings to the stallion
during the breeding season ("book"). If after the commence-
ment of the breeding season the syndicate manager notifies the
co-owner that his nomination has been lost because the stallion
is to be bred to a reduced book of mares, or no mares at all,
then the mare owner may try to sue for damages beyond the
contract price.' 2' The co-owner should, therefore, protect himself
by assuring that, under those circumstances, the mare owner will
have no cause of action against him beyond the amount paid
for the nomination.
Damages for the loss of a booking are typically in contract,
although claims have been made in fraud. In Kwik-Lok'2 the
court noted that the rule for assessing damages in breach of
contract is to award recovery of all damages that naturally accrue
from the breach and to put the complaining party into as good
a position monetarily as he would have been in had the contract
been performed. Thus, in Kwik-Lok, it was necessary to deter-
mine the market value of the breeding right at the time the losses
occurred. '2
"I If the mare owner follows this procedure, he can defuse any argument from the
syndicate manager that the manager did not receive notice. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fidelity
Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 260 F.2d 951, 954 (6th Cir. 1958) (Notice is knowledge
or information equivalent to knowledge.). Where both the holder of the season and the
mare owner contact the syndicate manager, the notice element is more than satisfied.
See id.
2 See note 113 supra for a discussion of the available remedies.
702 P.2d at 1230.
,u Id. at 1230-31. Ironically, once the breach has occurred, it is the mare owner
who will try to prove a high market value and the stallion owner who will downplay its
value. U.C.C. § 2-723 (1972) provides that market price will be that price prevailing
within any reasonable time before or after the time of judgment if the prevailing price
of such goods when the aggrieved party learned of the breach is not readily available.
U.C.C. § 2-724 (1972) permits the admission of prices reported in trade journals as
evidence of a market price.
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In Appleby v. Hendrix,'24 the plaintiffs brought a deceptive
trade practices suit for misrepresentation in the sale of a stallion
sold for breeding purposes.' 25 Although the only issue was whether
the suit was properly venued, the court did recognize fraud as
a potential cause of action. 26 Because fraud is not dischargeable
in bankruptcy, a stallion owner suffering financial reverses should
be especially careful .about the representations made to the buy-
ers of seasons.
CONCLUSION
Breeding is the foundation of the horse industry. Although
there are issues common to each mating, the parties must be
careful to protect their respective interests adequately when the
breeding contract is prepared. To prevent breeding contract con-
troversies, each horseowner must draw on his own experience,
evaluate his particular needs, and then carefully draft an agree-
ment to ensure that the breeding contract fits his situation. If a
dispute arises, however, the principals and their attorneys should
be cognizant of the many diverse areas of law that impact on
the breeding rights transaction, so that they can utilize all avail-
able theories in advancing their cases.
1- 673 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
,5 Id. at 297.
126 Id. at 297-98.
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